![]() ![]() (1946), some proponents think of this situation as analogous to howĪgreeing testimonies in court can lead to a verdict although each In splendid isolation, or so it is thought. Theįact that our beliefs cohere can establish their truth, even thoughĮach individual belief may lack justification entirely if considered Reason for a belief except another belief” (Davidson, 1986). As Davidson puts it, “hat distinguishes aĬoherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a The way in which they hang together or dovetail so as to produce aĬoherent set. A more substantialĬontrasting proposal is that what justifies our beliefs is ultimately Save a suggestive metaphore about webs of belief. Theory because it leaves us with no positive account of justification, The mere rejection of foundationalism is not itself an alternative “web of belief” (Quine and Ullian 1970, cf. Not distinguish between basic or foundational and non-basic or derivedīeliefs, treating rather all our beliefs as equal members of a Rather than conceiving the structure of our knowledge on the model ofĮuclidean geometry, with its basic axioms and derived theorems, theseĮpistemologists favor a holistic picture of justification which does ![]() Justificatory structure underlying rationalism and empiricism alike. Justification have led many epistemologists to think that there mustīe something fundamentally wrong with the way in which the debate hasīeen framed, prompting their rejection of the foundationalist The difficulties pertaining to both rationalism and empiricism about Thus, Davidson (1986) complains that advocates haveīeen unable to explain the relation between experience and belief that Position have questioned the intelligibility of the non-doxastic Role in justification coherence plays, if any. ![]() Non-doxastic support, how strong the support is on its own, and what Such foundationalist views vary on the source of the ![]() Toĭo so it may not have to appeal to self-evidence, indubitability orĬertainty. Non-doxastic support would terminate the regress of justification. Supplementation to be strong enough for knowledge. This support can be defeasible and it can require Non-doxastic source of epistemic support that requires no support of Of foundationalism according to which some beliefs have some The exact characterization ofįoundationalism is a somewhat contentious issue. Indubitable or else not informative enough to justify a sufficient Our knowledge in the allegedly indubitable data of the senses.ĭepending on how they are understood, sense data are either not Similar problems hound empiricist attempts to ground all Thus, theĬartesian rationalist picture of justification seems far too Strict logical sense from other things we believe in. Thought, are neither based on self-evident truths nor derivable in a Take ourselves to justifiably believe satisfies these austereĬonditions: many of our apparently justified beliefs, it is commonly But, as is often argued, little of what we A tradition inspired by Descartes holds that justified beliefs are those that are either self-evidently true or deduced from self-evident truths. Justification is, and classical accounts of that notion have turned This does not prevent manyĪuthors from claiming that coherence justification is an indication orĪ central problem in epistemology is to explain when we are justified in holdingĪ proposition to be true. Take the notion of truth for granted, at least for the purposes of Rather, they either favor a correspondence theory of truth or Theory of justification without advocating a coherence theory of In the British idealist tradition, typically subscribe to a coherence Modern coherence theorists, in contrast to some earlier writers Latter is a theory of what it means for a belief or proposition to be Subject to be justified in holding the belief or set of beliefs. Means for a belief or a set of beliefs to be justified, or for a TheĬoherence theory of justification should be distinguished from theĬoherence theory of truth. Held, just in case the belief coheres with a set of beliefs, the setįorms a coherent system or some variation on these themes. According to the coherence theory of justification, also known asĬoherentism, a belief or set of beliefs is justified, or justifiably ![]()
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